Contract Administration

Construction Law, Contract Administration

FIDIC’S FOUR NEW STANDARD FORMS OF CONTRACT: Risks, Force Majeure and Termination

 By Christopher R. Seppala

I propose briefly to discuss five topics in the three new Books for major works (the new Construction Contract, the Plant Contract and the EPC Contract), as follows:

 (1) Contractor’s risk and “Employer’s Risks”,

(2) Indemnities,

(3) Limitation of Liability,

(4) The New Force Majeure Clause, and

(5) Grounds and Procedure for Termination of the Contract by the Employer and the Contractor. …

Construction Law, Contract Administration

Making Demands on Advance Payment Guarantees and Performance Bonds: The Test to Secure Summary Judgment on a Claim before the English Court

by Karen Gough

We are in the midst of a world-wide recession. So, in times when contractors’ liquidity and therefore their very survival is more at risk than usual, and employers are more than usually jittery about the ability of contractors to complete works, a recent decision on a claim to enforce an advance payment guarantee and a performance bonds is of particular interest to construction law practitioners. …

Construction Law, Contract Administration

Are lawyers ready to leave their comfort zones to set the world’s infrastructure projects on the right track?

by Martin Harman

I have just returned from a family holiday in India, our first visit together although I am a frequent business traveller there. Apart from the beauty and vibrancy of the country and its people, what struck me most was that when travelling on business one is so very removed from the real life of the people of the country. I spend a large part of my time working as an international legal counsel to Indian law firms and Indian corporates who are at the forefront of the delivery of India’s infrastructure vision, a vision that requires, as just one example, the delivery of 20 kilometres of road every day over the next few years. For the business traveller, whose main transport experience is a journey from hotel to office, the scale of the infrastructure deficit begins to come into focus but as a tourist traveller, it looms extremely large. …

Contract Administration

Tests on Completion under the FIDIC Yellow Book

by Sarah Thomas

I am a contractor working on a wastewater project in Eastern Europe, using the FIDIC Yellow Book –Design & Build. Vol.3 of our contract contains the following clause:

“Tests on Completion

The test on completion duration shall be 90 days.

The first 30 days shall be a monitoring period during which the Contractor sets up the operation of the plant and conducts his own water quality tests to confirm that the final effluent consent has been met. At the end of this period the Contractor shall notify the Engineer that the plant is complete and meeting the Process Guarantee which then shall be met by a further 30 consecutive days before Taking Over can take place.”

We have met the final 30 consecutive days successfully and want taking over. The Employer says we must complete the 90 days which takes us outside of the construction period and hence delay damages are being threatened.

I say we have satisfied the contract at the end of the 30 consecutive days and we should get Take Over even though it is not 90 days.

Have you any idea if we are right in our assessment?

Answer:
Firstly, a couple of brief provisos. I assume that you have made no amendments to the Yellow Book that affect this issue. I’m also assuming that, as you say, otherwise the works have indeed all been completed in accordance with the Contract.

Have the Tests on Completion been passed and are the Works ready for Taking Over?

Obviously your argument is that having satisfied the first 30 day monitoring period and then completed the further 30 consecutive day period and having notified the Engineer that the plant is complete and meeting the Process Guarantee, you have therefore satisfied the requirements for completion and Take Over.

Clause 10 – which deals with Taking Over – says that the Works must have been completed in accordance with the Contract and that a Taking-Over Certificate must have been issued. The Employer must issue such certificate within 28 days of an application if the Works are substantially complete in accordance with the Contract (i.e. apart from minor outstanding work and defects not substantially affecting the Works); otherwise the certificate is deemed to have been issued.

Crucially, “completion” for these purposes includes:

• achieving the passing of the Tests on Completion; and
• “completing all work which is stated in the Contract as being required for the Works to be considered completed for the purposes of taking over”.

So it all comes down to (1) what is required to achieve passing of the Tests on Completion and (2) what the Contract states needs to be completed to achieve take over.

Under the Yellow Book, “Tests on Completion” means “those tests which are specified in the Contract or agreed by both Parties…and which are carried out under Clause 9 [Tests on Completion] before the Works…are taken over by the Employer”.

Clause 9 goes on to spell out the process for carrying out these tests, which falls into 3 stages – pre-commissioning tests, commissioning tests and trail operation – the latter which is intended to show that the plant is operating reliably.

Ambiguous provisions

I think that the Engineer/Employer will forcefully argue that waiting for the 90th day to elapse is part of the “trial operation” and is required for you to pass the Tests on Completion. I agree that there is some ambiguity in the wording in Volume 3 of the Contract as it states: “At the end of this period the Contractor shall notify the Engineer that the plant is complete and meeting the Process Guarantee which then shall be met by a further 30 consecutive days before Taking Over can take place.” However, my own view is that the drafting of the full testing period is clear and explicit – “The test on completion duration shall be 90 days“. Bearing in mind that FIDIC explicitly states “The documents forming the Contract are to be taken as mutually explanatory of one another” I do not think that this wording is actually inconsistent with the words: “which then shall be met by a further 30 consecutive days before Taking Over can take place”. In my view, all the Contract is saying is that the actual commissioning tests period is 30 days but there is then a further 30 day trial operation period to ensure the plant is operating reliably. This is also consistent with the description of Tests on Completion (and the 3 stages) described in Clause 9.1.
Of course, it is open to you to request clarification on this point from the Engineer. Clause 1.5.2 of the General Conditions provides that: “If an ambiguity or discrepancy is found in the documents, the Engineer shall issue any necessary clarification or instruction.”

You do not mention if the Engineer in this case is an independent engineer or is part of the Employer organisation. Whichever is the case, he may well come to the same view as the Employer and, in my opinion, this would be consistent with:

• the express wording (”The test on completion duration shall be 90 days“);
• interpreting the documents as mutually explanatory of each other; and
• the 3 stage process of Tests on Completion which includes a “trial operation”.

Whether or not the Engineer is truly independent, Clause 3.5 applies when a party asks the Engineer for clarification and provides that he must consult with each party in an endeavour to reach agreement. If agreement is not reached, “the Engineer shall make a fair determination in accordance with the Contract, taking due regard of all relevant circumstances.”

The Engineer must give notice to both parties of the determination with supporting particulars. Each Party shall give effect to each agreement or determination unless and until revised under Clause 20 (Claims, Disputes and Arbitration).

What do you do now?

Whilst I think that the correct interpretation is that the testing period is the full 90 days, I am conscious that complying with this period will put you in delay and at risk of liquidated damages for delay. Therefore in practical terms, I think that you should at least make the argument that you have already substantially completed. I think that there is sufficient ambiguity in the Volume 3 wording to argue that the Tests on Completion have been completed and that you are entitled to issue of the Taking-Over Certificate. Therefore you should apply for issue of this certificate if you haven’t already done so (although if you haven’t already done so you will still have to wait at least 28 days before the Engineer is obliged to issue the certificate or you can argue that it is deemed to be issued).

Under Clause 10.1 [Taking Over of the Works and Sections], the Engineer is deemed to have issued a Taking Over Certificate if he fails either to issue a TO Certificate or rejects the Contractor’s application for a TO Certificate within a period of 28 days after receiving the Contractor’s application.

You have not said whether or not the Engineer has rejected the application. If he has not, and more than 28 days has elapsed since you issued it, then the TO Certificate will be deemed to have been issued on the last day of the 28-day period.

Of course, if you applied for the TO Certificate right before the end of the 30+30 days, then the Engineer has up to 28 days to issue or reject, and you are almost in the same position as if your completion test phase was 90 days. If you applied substantially earlier than that then it will make a bigger difference and might be the difference between completing on time or late.

If you are late, then there probably is no harm in making the application for a Taking-Over Certificate. Note that in accordance with Clause 10.1.3(b) of the General Conditions, if the Engineer wishes to reject the application, he has to give reasons and specify the work that is required to be done by the Contractor to enable the TO Certificate to be issued. Even if the Engineer has purported to reject your application, you might be able to argue that he has not done so in accordance with the contract, because he has not specified the work that is required to be done in order to enable the TO Certificate to be issued. Of course in my view, he is likely to simply point to the further 30 day trail operation period under the Contract.

Delay to Testing

Whilst I do not think you have a basis of claim (as my interpretation of the Contract is that you have not yet fully passed the Tests on Completion), if the Employer’s insistence on you waiting until the end of 90 days after the start of the testing period is not permitted under the Contract, there is potentially the right to claim for delay. Clause 7.4.5 provides that “If the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs Cost … as a result of a delay for which the Employer is responsible, the Contractor shall give notice to the Engineer and shall be entitled to claim both an extension of time and “payment of any such Cost plus reasonable profit, which shall be included in the Contract Price” (Clause 7.4.5(b)). Equally there is the ground in Clause 8.4.1 (e), being “any delay, impediment or prevention caused by or attributable to the Employer, the Employer’s Personnel, or the Employer’s other contractors on the Site.” The Employer’s Personnel, as defined, includes the Engineer.

Any right to claim will be subject to strict compliance with FIDIC’s notice provisions in Sub-Clause 20.1 (Contractor’s Claims)). I have previously stressed the importance of getting your notice exactly right in the previous Q&A; click here to read more. After receiving this notice, the Engineer shall proceed in accordance with Sub-Clause 3.5 (Determinations) (see above) to agree or determine these matters.

One final note

Finally, do you have any minutes or notes of any discussions with the Employer about completion testing? If you do, have a look at them to see whether they clarify the position. Obviously it will be helpful if you have evidence that you and the Employer intended the tests to consist of the 30-day monitoring period plus the second consecutive 30-day period only. It is worth noting that FIDIC Yellow Book does not include an “entire agreement” clause precluding extra contractual documents/negotiations in interpreting the Contract. If you have clear evidence that the parties both intended the completion tests to last for 30 days plus 30 days (only) then you may be able to claim successfully that the figure 90 was inserted into the contract by mistake instead of 60, in the event that the dispute goes to arbitration.

 

Kluwer Construction Blog

Construction Law, Contract Administration

Contractual Easter Eggs

by John Bishop

Monday was a public holiday in China, to celebrate Qing Ming, the Chinese tomb-sweeping festival which also happily coincided with Easter. I spent some time explaining to my Chinese friends the Easter story, and how in recent times there have been other interpretations involving bunnies and chocolate eggs.

China has been busy hatching some of its own contractual eggs by taking FIDIC standard forms traditionally used by International Contractors in their overseas projects, and adapted to reflect local conditions and times.

The FIDIC Silver Book has been considered by the the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (”MOHURD”) to promote the EPC contracting model in China. A draft MOHURD standard form was prepared with reference to FIDIC Silver Book and international engineering contracting practices, and released for public comments at the end of 2009. This adaptation by MOHURD appears to have been partly influenced by the GF-1999-0201, a standard form widely used in China, mostly for government financed projects using procurement methods such as competitive bidding.

The resulting risk allocations have turned out quite different from the original “turnkey” nature of the FIDIC Silver Book that may come as a bit of a surprise to those used to EPC contracts. Owners and developers may not get quite the turnkey solution they were expecting in relation to matters such as responsibility for information as to underground conditions and site obstructions, the obligation to obtain approvals, permits and licenses and especially in relation to site safety. It will be of great interest for the construction sector to see how the Chinese EPC form of contract, when finally issued, in fact addresses these matters.

Similarly the Regulation on Construction Market Administration which is likely to be promulgated by the State Council later this year appears influenced by the FIDIC Yellow Book and is likely to provide a clearer legal basis for adopting some of the forms of contracting widely used in the international market, especially in respect of Design and Build contracts.

This Easter also coincides with the anniversary of the Independent Mediation Rules 2008 introduced by the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC) on 1 April 2008. These rules were implemented after the participation of over 120 arbitrators and construction engineering experts, including very well known experts. I know this, because my collegue Hew Kian Heong and I were also asked for my own humble contributions to this effort. I therefore know that these Mediation Rules were also drafted so that they could be used to support a multi-tiered dispute resolution process as envisaged by standard form contracts such as ICE and FIDIC.

One of the key attractions of the FIDIC suite of contracts is flexibility, which allow their renewed use in many new markets by taking into account local laws and regulation, and I have no doubt my Chinese friends will capitalize on this advantage its fullest.

 

Kluwer Construction Blog

Contract Administration, Project Management

We do not negotiate! Or do we?

by Conrad Egbert
With the market having fallen 40% until now, many clients, contractors and suppliers across the region have begun to renegotiate contracts. CW talks to some of the top experts in the industry to find out what they think about the trend. Last week, CW discovered that City of Arabia – the Ilyas & Mustafa Galadari owned US $3 billion development – is currently renegotiating certain contracts. …

Contract Administration

Mediate, adjudicate or both?

by Larry Lin
Increasingly, when a dispute arises between two contracting parties, they are strongly encouraged to settle the dispute in question through various types of resolution methods available. Such methods are collectively called alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and include negotiation, mediation or adjudication and should be used before the dispute is escalated into arbitration or litigation. …

Contract Administration

Administration of project preliminaries

by Fattah Aderinto

Estimators and project administrators often administer preliminaries as either function of project cost, project duration or adjudication parameters. Also, most contracts in the Middle East often include an item under preambles, indicating a fixed method of administering preliminaries. These approaches do not agree with the logic of preliminaries and in the long run, are to the disadvantage of both the client and the contractor. …

Construction Law, Contract Administration

Consultancy agreements and allegations of illegality

by Matthias Scherer

Contractors and suppliers operating abroad often conclude contracts with agents, consultants and other intermediaries who assist them in tender processes as well as in negotiating and performing contracts. Typically, these consultancy agreements provide that disputes are to be submitted to arbitration. Most disputes concern the consultants’ entitlement to a fee. In these disputes, the principal often argues that the contract was illegal under the applicable law. This notably occurred in two cases which led to two recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on applications to set aside or revise arbitral awards.

In the first case, a Swiss and a Taiwanese party had entered into a consultancy agreement in respect of a contract which the Swiss party wished to obtain for managing and maintaining an electricity plant in Taiwan. On the basis of the agreement, the Taiwanese consultant later initiated arbitration under the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration to obtain payment of his fees. The arbitral tribunal found in a partial award that the consultancy agreement was valid.

The Swiss principal applied to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court for revision of the partial award, the time limit for the setting aside of the award, which would have been the ordinary remedy in such a case, having already expired. The principal contended before the Supreme Court that the agreement had an illegal content as it contemplated bribery, and produced new evidence to support its claim. The Court denied the request, as the prerequisites under Swiss law for a review of the award were not met. Indeed, according to the Court, the evidence could have been produced in the arbitration and was therefore not new. The arbitration resumed and the arbitrators eventually rendered a final award in favour of the consultant.

The principal sought to have the final award set aside on the grounds that it breached public policy, relying on the same evidence on which it had previously sought to rely in its request for review of the partial award. The principal further argued that the Supreme Court must examine the alleged nullity of a contract on its own motion. The Court however dismissed the application. It found that the principal could and should have produced the evidence purportedly showing bribery during the arbitration. The Court also ruled that it would not review on its own motion the validity of private law contracts.

The principal again raised its public policy defence in the subsequent enforcement proceedings in Switzerland. The competent cantonal court however ruled that arguments which could have been raised in setting aside proceedings could no longer be raised at the enforcement stage.

In another dispute between a consultant and a principal, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court admitted the principal’s request to set aside an arbitral award due to procedural fraud. In the highly publicized Thales v Frontier AG matter, the award was annulled and the matter remanded to the arbitrators. The facts of the case are summarised below.

In 1989, France authorised the export of new F-3000 frigates to Taiwan. Mainland China objected to the export and a few months later, upon request of a French minister, France withdrew the export authorisation. In 1990, Thomson CSF (which later became Thales), the manufacturer of the frigates, entered into an agreement with Frontier, a Swiss company, to act as its agent. According to the agreement, Frontier was to receive remuneration amounting to 1% of the value of Thomson CSF’s contract with Taiwan for its assistance in relation to the sale of the warships. Behind Frontier was Alfred Sirven, a high ranking manager with the French oil company Elf Aquitaine. Subsequently, in 1991, the French government reversed its previous position and gave its final approval for the sale of the ships. The contract between Thomson and Taiwan was concluded on 31 August 1991 for a purchase price of approximately USD 2.5 billion.

Thomson however refused to pay Frontier, which initiated ICC arbitration as a result. In the arbitration, Thomson contended that the objective of the contract was in fact for Frontier to solicit the services of Edmond Kwan, a consultant of Elf Aquitaine in China, in order that he use his political connections to persuade the Chinese to cease their opposition to the sale of the warships to Taiwan. Thomson argued that the contract was void as its object was influence peddling. Messrs Sirven and Kwan, as well as other witnesses, were heard by the arbitral tribunal.

In 1996, the tribunal rendered its award, ordering Thomson to pay the contractual fee to Frontier. The tribunal found that Frontier had provided the services which were due under the contract by assisting Thomson, through Edmond Kwan, to appease Chinese opposition to the sale. The tribunal admitted that influence peddling was unlawful but found that it had not been proven that influence peddling had occurred. Thomson subsequently initiated criminal proceedings in France against Mr. Kwan and others for giving false testimony before the arbitral tribunal. On 1 October 2008, the French authorities ceased their investigation as a result of Mr. Sirven’s death and because there was insufficient evidence against the other actors. The French authorities however concluded that Sirven had indeed given false testimony during the arbitration.

On 17 December 2008, Thales (formerly Thomson) brought a request for review of the 1996 arbitral award before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on the basis of the findings of the French authorities. The French investigation had shown that the real objective of the contract between Thomson and Frontier was not to lobby for the sale of the warships in China, but rather to persuade a French minister, who wanted to avoid retaliation measures by Mainland China, to reconsider his objections to the sale. Commissions had therefore been paid by Frontier to Mr. Sirven and a woman who had privileged relations with the minister. Mr. Sirven had represented to the arbitral tribunal that Mr. Kwan had been the only beneficiary of a commission, however it was uncovered that he had implicated Mr. Kwan merely for the purposes of the arbitration. The Swiss Supreme Court ruled that it had been established that Mr. Sirven had orchestrated an influence peddling scheme to the detriment of the French authorities. He had misled the arbitral tribunal and was therefore guilty of procedural fraud. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, Mr. Sirven’s untruthful testimony had had a direct influence on the tribunal’s award. Consequently, the Supreme Court annulled the award and remanded the matter to the original arbitral tribunal or a new tribunal to be constituted in accordance with the ICC Rules.

Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from these two cases. The first is that arbitral tribunals and the Swiss Supreme Court will not uphold contracts that are flawed by illegality. However, it is for the party which alleges an illegality to prove it. Another conclusion to be drawn is that if evidence of illegality exists at the time of the arbitration, it must imperatively be produced in the arbitral proceedings. A party therefore cannot hold back evidence, even if it is self-incriminating, and rely on it in subsequent annulment or enforcement proceedings in the event of an unfavourable outcome of the arbitral proceedings. On the other hand, if a party misleads the arbitral tribunal, as could be uncovered in subsequent criminal proceedings, an arbitral award may not stand.

By Matthias Scherer and Sam Moss

 

 

Kluwer Construction Blog

Contract Administration

Seven strategies to beat the recession

One may curse, whine, pray or plead but there still seems to be no escape from the after effects of the financial downturn. But before this recession monster starts gulping down our hard-earned savings, let’s attack it using some time-tested strategies and tools. The following habits combined with your indomitable spirit will ensure that you are left with plenty of cash to meet your needs and more: …

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